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Tech and Authoritarianism: How the People’s
Republic of China is Using Data to Control Hong
Kong and Why The U.S. is Vulnerable
Bryce Neary*

I.

INTRODUCTION

To protect civil liberties, one must retain a level of privacy that is
exempt from government intervention. As we continue to intertwine our
lives with technology, it has become increasingly important to advocate
for privacy laws and protect Fourth Amendment rights. The accumulation
of a person’s online data may be extremely revealing. A government’s
access to this data is a backdoor into every potential “suspect” and
“terrorist” who has ever made a suspicious Google search, social media
post, or phone call.
In the United States, the law must continue to adapt to new
technologies to preserve individual rights to privacy that people have
fought to protect since the country’s inception. 1 Currently, law
enforcement agencies continue to use “terrorism” to justify violating
American’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy.2 The recent ruling in U.S.
v. Moalin further emphasizes courts are not willing to find Fourth
Amendment violations if intelligence agencies produce a guilty party. 3
However, if the courts in the United States continue to turn a blind eye to
the federal government’s blatant violation of individuals’ right to privacy,
Americans risks exposure to an authoritarian fate similar to that of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). As demonstrated in the recent “retaking” of Hong Kong,
fundamental freedoms can be stolen from citizens in the blink of an eye.4

*

The author is a 3L at Seattle University School of Law and wishes to thank his friends and family
for their continued support.
1
See e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2
See Timothy B. Lee, Here's Everything we know about PRISM to Date, THE WASH. POST
WONKBLOG (June 12, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-knowabout-prism-to-date/ [https://perma.cc/NR26-QY83].
3
United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 985 (9th Cir. 2020).
4
Paul Mozur & Lin Qiqing, Hong Kong Takes Symbolic Stand Against China’s High-Tech Controls,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/technology/hong-kong-chinatech-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/7YRM-AL8C].
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The ruling in Moalin creates serious implications for privacy rights in
the United States and lessons we can learn from Hong Kong’s fight against
PRC surveillance. In Moalin, the court held that mass data surveillance of
Americans without probable cause is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 5 In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit held that the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires records to be relevant to a
specific investigation rather than counterterrorism investigations
generally. 6 This was a pivotal ruling because it answered many
constitutional questions that arose when whistleblower Edward Snowden
revealed that United States intelligence agencies commonly monitored
United States citizens’ private data.7
In comparison, the pro-democracy events in the formerly semiautonomous territory of Hong Kong took a turn for the worse when the
PRC used mass surveillance methods to suppress information, track down
dissidents, and silence protests.8 The loss of civil liberties in Hong Kong
is, without privacy regulations and safeguards, the United States is ripe to
follow a similar path.
As journalists, protestors, and pro-democracy advocates continue to
be hunted down and arrested, Hong Kong has shown us that antigovernment sentiment can be easily molded into “terrorist activities.” 9
This situation has demonstrated why privacy is necessary to protect civil
liberties. Without proper regulation, sweeping surveillance invites the
potential abuse of government police power. While the United States
operates under the guise of pure terrorism prevention, the PRC has made
it clear that there will not be any tolerance for anything remotely
resembling anti-government behavior.10
As technology continues to evolve and our data becomes more
interconnected and accessible than ever, the surveillance methods
outlawed in Moalin will become obsolete, and the law will be inadequate
to protect American’s privacy. This growing digital footprint will allow
United States federal intelligence agencies to engage in surveillance
activities those used to silence dissent and denigrate democracy in Hong
Kong.11
This article will outline the recent Ninth Circuit ruling in Moalin, its
implications on privacy rights in the United States, and the United States’
law enforcement’s justified use of surveillance methods to track down the
5

Moalin, 973 F.3d, at 996.
Id.
7
Cf. Fred H. Cate & Beth E. Cate, The Supreme Court and Info. Priv., INT’L PRIV. AND DATA LAW
(Sept. 26, 2012), https://academic.oup.com/idpl/article/2/4/255/676934 [https://perma.cc/LES6BU28] (Edward Snowden leaked information from within the NSA, which some believed to be a
heinous violation of both U.S. citizens’ and U.S. residents’ Fourth Amendment Constitutional right
to privacy).
8
National Security Law: Hong Kong rounds up 53 pro-democracy activists, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55555299 [https://perma.cc/HEB43NN3].
9
Id.
10
James D. Fry, Privacy, Predictability and Internet Surveillance in the U.S. and China: Better the
Devil You Know?, 37 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 419, 440-442 (2015).
11
Charlie Warzel & Stuart A. Thompson, They Stormed the Capitol. Their Apps Tracked Them., N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/opinion/capitol-attack-cellphonedata.html [https://perma.cc/7MUV-MAEK].
6
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rioters who stormed the United States Capitol Building. The United States
system will then be compared to current Chinese law and the ethical
balancing test that must be used when analyzing Hong Kong’s fight
against PRC surveillance. Furthermore, a discussion of the thin line that
separates a government’s compelling interest to protect its citizens through
surveillance, and the potential infringement of their fundamental rights to
privacy will follow. Lastly, this article will analyze how the Chinese
government’s use of surveillance in Hong Kong has provided the United
States with a road map to combat government surveillance in the coming
years. While China’s use of surveillance is well known, the United States
still operates under the guise of terrorism prevention. The unique
perspective taken here will discuss events that are currently unfolding. The
Trump supporters who flooded the United States Capitol in January 2021
have only convoluted this topic, as law enforcement agencies’ use of
surveillance within the United States has become widely justified.12 To
conclude, the uprising in Hong Kong and the United States Capitol will be
compared and discussed to highlight when a society deems the use of
surveillance to be rational or necessary.
II.

THE SNOWDEN LEAK

Edward Snowden’s leak revealed that the dictum, “If you have nothing
to hide, you have nothing to fear,” is a presumption that may no longer be
true in the United States.13On June 5th, 2013, a British newspaper, The
Guardian, began publishing a series of articles disclosing highly classified
aspects of certain National Security Agency electronic surveillance
operations involving not only extensive collection of foreign
communications, including internet traffic, but the collection of metadata
associated with phone calls made by United States citizens.14 The NSA
internet surveillance program involved the targeting of foreign persons
“reasonably believed to be outside the United States using broad
surveillance information from popular U.S. tech companies servers. 15
These companies included Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, among
others.16 Unlike a domestic criminal investigation, “[t]he NSA is engaging
in bulk collection absent any reasonable suspicion that the individuals,
whose telephone information is being collected, are engaged in any
wrongdoing. To the contrary, almost all of the information obtained will
bear no relationship whatsoever to criminal activity.”17
This program gives the government access to a compilation of
information that could be incredibly revealing for even the most innocent
Americans, such as internet search histories, e-mails, file transfers, and

12

Id.
Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, The NSA Files: Decoded, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillancerevelations-decoded#section/1 [https://perma.cc/3PN4-5399].
14
Id.
15
See Lee, supra note 2.
16
Id.
17
Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Const. Considerations, 37 HARV J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 757, 869 (2014).
13
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live chats.18 These obtrusive practices are justified based on the invisible
threats that loom in cyberspace.19 Many modern terrorist groups operate
using covert agents who disguise their online communications and
movements with normal peacetime behaviors.20 The NSA states that their
broad use of internet surveillance protects against terrorism globally,
hostile foreign governments, and the online trade of weapons and drugs.21
However, the broad data collection methods used to combat these issues
have proved to infringe on the rights of United States residents far
removed from such operations.22
Edward Snowden and NSA contractor Booz Allen Hamilton leaked
sensitive information from within the NSA in 2013.23 When The Guardian
revealed Snowden’s identity, the United States government charged
Snowden with “unauthorized communication of national defense
information” and “willful communication of classified communications
intelligence information to an unauthorized person,” under the 1917
Espionage Act. 24 Snowden sought refuge in Hong Kong, and then in
Russia, where he has been ever since.25
In addition to the exposure of the United States government’s
infringement on citizens’ rights, it was revealed that intelligence agencies
monitored the phone conversations of thirty-five world leaders. 26 NSA
officials encouraged “senior officials in customer departments such as the
White House, State Department, and Pentagon to share their rolodexes” of
contacts so the Agency could add the phone numbers of leading foreign
politicians to their surveillance systems. 27 For example, German Prime

18

See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps into User Data of Apple,
Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
[https://perma.cc/T53S7JFL] (reporting on the previously undisclosed PRISM system and including the reaction of
representatives from Google and Apple).
19
NSA Cybersecurity, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY CENT. SEC. SER.,
https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/Overview/ [https://perma.cc/5FB2-54FS].
20
John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency's Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37
HARV J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 905 (2014).
21
NSA Cybersecurity, supra note 19.
22
See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 17 at 849.
23
Glenn Greenwald ET AL., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance
Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/3R85-Q9X6]. See also Deb Riechman, Costs of Snowden leak still mounting 5
years later, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 3, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/hi-state-wirenational-security-europe-russia-government-surveillance-797f390ee28b4bfbb0e1b13cfedf0593
[https://perma.cc/H39Z-AXDG].
24
Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. charges Snowden with espionage, THE WASH. POST (June 21,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-withespionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html
[https://perma.cc/H6PL-AZPX].
25
See Macaskill & Dance, supra note 13.
26
James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders after US Official Handed over Contacts,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillanceworld-leaders-calls [https://perma.cc/PD6U-YP7G] (reporting on Snowden's document claiming
surveillance of the phone conversations of world leaders by the National Security Agency).
27
Id.
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Minister Angela Merkel’s mobile phone was allegedly monitored for
eleven years before Snowden’s leak.28
However, some believe that Snowden’s wanton disregard for United
States intelligence agencies’ mission makes him a traitor. 29 “[I]n
espionage terminology, an agent is a person who provides information to
an operative... The agent might not be aware that he or she is providing
information to a foreign spy depending upon how the operative approaches
an agent.”30 In Snowden’s case, “the fact that he was not an agent of a
foreign government does not change the fact that he intentionally
committed espionage and treason.”31 After all, Snowden fled to Russia of
all places, a country which likely benefitted from Snowden’s disclosures.
Keith Alexander, director of the NSA, said Snowden’s disclosures caused
“irreversible and significant damage” to the agency’s foreign surveillance
operations.32 NSA officials say that foreign individuals or groups targeted
for surveillance may now switch to more secure communication
methods.33 “When Osama bin Laden learned that the NSA was monitoring
his satellite telephone, for example, he switched to messages by courier.”34
This raises the question, does the breach of U.S. citizens’ personal data
justify giving foreign operatives an advantage?
To summarize this essential background: Snowden believed that
United States intelligence agencies were abusing their power and
infringing upon people’s private sphere without proper justification or
oversight. Whether his actions were right or wrong is up to debate;
however, there is no doubt that his actions sparked a conversation about
privacy laws in the United States. Thus, it is important to understand what
privacy rights that people in the United States enjoy based on its
foundational doctrine and case law. The next section of this article will
analyze the framework of legal principles intended to ground this
discussion; subsequent sections will focus on the arguments used to justify
its exploitation.
III.

U.S. LEGAL BACKGROUND

United States intelligence agencies utilize their surveillance
techniques under either national security or law enforcement
28

According to Snowden, the NSA monitored Chancellor Merkel's mobile phone for 11 years,
including the numbers called, duration and location (metadata) and the contents of her calls and text
messages. See Derek Scally, Dial M for Merkel: Angela's Next Move, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/dial-m-for-merkel-angela-s-next-move-1.1580987
[https://perma.cc/VRW8-9RT4] (reporting that Merkel's phone was monitored for 11 years by the
National Security Agency and what the implications for Germany were).
29
Ira Winkler, Snowden wasn’t a Russian agent, but a traitor just the same, The Hill (April 5, 2017,
12:45 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/homeland-security/327414-snowden-wasnt-arussian-agent-but-a-traitor-just-the [https://perma.cc/Q5KH-CER2].
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Tom Gjelten, The Effects of the Snowden Leaks Aren’t What He Intended, NPR (Sept. 30, 2013,
4:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/09/20/224423159/the-effects-of-the-snowden-leaks-arentwhat-he-intended [https://perma.cc/4EMF-ZN59].
33
Id.
34
Id.
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justifications.35 Although the two are generally analyzed under different
frameworks, they are not mutually exclusive. This section will delineate
the two frameworks and focus on the major cornerstones of U.S. law that
upholds the privacy rights of American citizens. This article will discuss
five cornerstones of American privacy law. First, this article will consider
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution; second, the Foreign
Intelligence Service Act (FISA), to establish the foundation of modern
surveillance policy; third, an analysis of the broad allowances created by
the USA PATRIOT Act; fourth, the subsequent USA Freedom Act and its
refinement of those policies; and finally, multiple examples of U.S. case
law will be introduced to provide insight into direct challenges of privacy
infringement.
Although there is no single comprehensive federal law that governs
privacy law in the United States, the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution forms the basis of privacy protection:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.36
It should be noted, “all constitutional rights—whether to speak freely,
confront one's accusers, be tried by a jury of one's peers—regulate the
public, but not the private, sector. In the absence of state action, therefore,
constitutional rights are not implicated in questions surrounding
privacy.”37 Thus, in the absence of state interest, constitutional rights are
not necessarily invoked in questions surrounding privacy.38
A. The Foreign Intelligence Service Act
To United States intelligence agencies’ power, it is necessary to
revert to the inception of FISA. In response to President Nixon’s usage of
federal resources, which included utilizing intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to spy on a politically motivated opposition,
President Carter signed the FISA into law in May of 1978.39 FISA created
a framework for the modern surveillance justifications that federal
agencies still rely on today.40 FISA allows the United States government
to engage in electronic surveillance and physical searches to obtain
“foreign intelligence information” that generally includes evidence of

35

NSA Cybersecurity, supra note 19.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37
“Although state action is usually found when the state acts toward a private person, the Supreme
Court has also found state action when the state affords a legal right to one private party which
impinges on the constitutional rights of another, see New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 264,
265 (1964), and in rare cases when a private party undertakes a traditionally public function, see
Marsh v Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), or when the activities of the state and a private entity are
sufficiently intertwined to render the private parties' activities public, see Evans v Newtown, 382 U.S.
296 (1966).” See Cate & Cate, supra note 7
38
Id. at 257.
39
Encyclopedia of Criminal Justice Ethics 1282 (Bruce A. Arrigo ed., 2014).
40
Yoo, supra note 20 at 906.
36
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terrorism, espionage, and sabotage.41 FISA can be used to target both U.S.
citizens and foreign nationals within the country and provides “simplified
procedures [to] obtain [] warrants for both electronic surveillance and
physical searches.”42 FISA allows surveillance to be conducted within the
United States based on a probable cause finding which suggests that the
identified suspect is a member of a foreign terrorist group or an agent of a
foreign power. 43 This low threshold is the clear differentiator between
searches based on routine law enforcement proceedings and those done for
national security purposes.
However, there are increased protections under FISA for U.S.
citizens. To obtain a warrant targeting a U.S. citizen, the Agency must
have probable cause to establish the person “knowingly engage[d] in
clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign
power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal
statutes of the United States.”44 Thus, FISA requires that the be knowingly
done and in violation of a criminal statute. A warrant can be obtained for
non-U.S. citizens if they act “in the United States as an officer of a foreign
power, or as a member of a foreign power…irrespective of whether the
person is inside the United States.”45
Those seeking warrants under is tasked with overseeing the
process by which executive agencies conduct surveillance for national
security purposes.46 FISC is composed of a panel of eleven judges, each
of whom serves a seven-year term.47 The Court of Review, composed of
three judges, hears appeals.48 Title I of FISA requires the government to
obtain judicial warrants from the court to conduct electronic surveillance
to satisfy national security needs.49 Once granted a warrant, FISA includes
no requirement that the Agency reports its activities back to the court.50
On its face, FISC seems like a plausible mechanism to uphold the
rights of citizens and foreigners through fair judicial due processes. FISC
is essentially a compromise between war–time powers and the

41

As enacted in 1978, FISA covered only electronic surveillance. It was amended in 1994 to cover
physical searches and again in 1998 to cover pen register, trap and trace devices, and business records
acquisition. See 50 U.S.C. § 1821 et seq. (physical searches); See also 50 U.S.C § 1841 et seq. (pen
register, trap and trace devices, and business records). “Foreign intelligence information” is a term
of art and is defined as “information related to and, if concerning a United States person, necessary
to, the ability of the United States to protect against an actual or potential attack, terrorism or sabotage
by a foreign power or agents thereof, or clandestine intelligence activities of a foreign power or agent
thereof, or information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to and, if
concerning a United States person, is necessary to, the national security of the United States or the
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
42
Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas
for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 276 (2009).
43
50 U.S.C. § 1805.
44
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A).
45
50 U.S.C. §1801(b)(1)(A).
46
50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-05.
47
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review, 1978-present, FED. JUD. CTR. (Oct.
20, 2021)
https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/about-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court
[https://perma.cc/EZ8X-SPXQ].
48
Id.
49
50 U.S.C. § 1805.
50
Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA Court: From Watchdog to Lapdog?, 34 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L. L. 249, 250 (2002).
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meticulousness of the United States criminal justice system. 51 FISA
requires investigators to identify an individual target, show probable cause,
and obtain a warrant issued by a federal court. 52 However, lenience is
given to intelligence agencies because FISC “does not require a showing
of probable cause of criminal activity by the target [of the investigation],
which the Fourth Amendment would [generally] require.” 53 The
government must only show that the probable cause “is linked to a foreign
power or terrorist group.”54
Further, FISC’s ruling statistics are contrary to their even-handed
judicial appearance. In 2012, the government applied to FISC on 1,789
occasions to have the ability to conduct electronic surveillance, and FISC
granted every one of those requests. 55 Between 1979 and 2012,
government agencies were granted 99.97% of all FISA warrant requests.56
FISA also allows warrantless surveillance up to one year for
communications “used exclusively between or among foreign powers”
where there is “no substantial likelihood” that a communication involving
a U.S. person would be acquired.57
Justifications, such as war–time powers, foreign conspiracy, and
the possibility of terrorism or espionage allow U.S. law enforcement to
fast-track their investigations under FISA. There is little doubt that
investigations regarding legitimate national security issues should be
handled swiftly and efficiently. However, the question that remains is
whether the safeguards created by FISC are substantial enough to protect
innocent people from indiscriminate targeting and Fourth Amendment
violations resulting from mass data collection methods. These questions
and their implications will be discussed below.
B. The USA PATRIOT Act
The PATRIOT Act increased surveillance powers for national
security purposes and loosened many of the FISA safeguards, which
allowed law enforcement to utilize a faster and more effective system to
combat terrorism.58 Five weeks after the terrorist attacks of September 11th,
2001, Congress enacted the now-infamous Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and

51

Yoo, supra note 20 at 905.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen., to the Hon. Harry Reid, Maj.
Leader of U.S. S. 1 (Apr. 30, 2013),
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2012rept.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC64-E5WL].
56
Conner Clark, Is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a Rubber Stamp? Ex Parte
Proceedings and the FISC Win Rate, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 125 (2014),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/is-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-really-arubber-stamp/ [https://perma.cc/V5YP-K4YQ]; See also Evan Perez, Secret Court's Oversight Gets
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324904004578535670310514616
[https://perma.cc/Q543-3PEA].
57
50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(1) & (A)(i).
58
The USA Patriot Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, Dep’t of Just.,
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm [https://perma.cc/XL2M-DGTS].
52
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Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATRIOT Act). 59 The Department of Justice
(DOJ) website describes the PATRIOT Act as the “leading role… to
protect innocent Americans from the deadly plans of terrorists dedicated
to destroying America and our way of life.” 60 Substantively, the DOJ
claims that “[t]he Patriot Act allows investigators to use the tools that were
already available to investigate organized crime and drug trafficking.”61
Alternatively, the ACLU claims that the PATRIOT Act n. It… is used in
ways that treat everyone as a suspect, and chills free expression.” 62
Among other things, the PATRIOT Act changed the following: (1)
allowed investigators to use surveillance methods deemed necessary for
seventy-two hours before obtaining a FISA warrant (previously twentyfour); (2) broadly expanded the definition of “terrorist organization,” to
include many domestic groups that engage in civil disobedience; (3)
expanded the search capabilities of investigators, allowing them to use
mass data collection methods including pen registers, trap and trace
devices, roving wiretaps; and (4) potentially the most consequential
feature of the PATRIOT Act, which was the modification of the FISA
language that set the standard for obtaining a warrant from a FISC judge. 63
To conduct surveillance before the FISA, the government had to assert that
the “purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information.” 64 Under the new modification, the government is only
required to show a “significant purpose.”65
The PATRIOT Act permits a broad array of surveillance methods
and devices. 66 Previously, investigators were required to narrow their
inquiry based on a single target. However, the PATRIOT Act broadened
investigator’s inquiries by allowing them to "hop" to every individual's
phone data who is in communication with the target's phone.67 Below is
59

Pub.L. No. 107-56, § 208(1), 115 Stat. 283 (2001). While this article will not go into the depth of
this act and its residual effects, it is important to highlight its origins and reactionary policies, which
lead to its more recent reductions.
60
The USA Patriot Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, supra note 58.
61
Id.
62
End Mass Surveillance Under the Patriot Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/nationalsecurity/privacy-and-surveillance/end-mass-surveillance-under-patriot-act [https://perma.cc/CVL9MYU4].
63
USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. USA PATRIOT ACT section 411.
(Section 411 expands the definition of terrorist organization as, “a political, social or other similar
group whose public endorsement of acts of terrorist activity the Secretary of State has determined
undermines United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities”). Id. at 115 Stat. 286. Id.
115 Stat. 213.
64
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000) (effective December 27, 2000 to October 25, 2001).
65
Sections 104(a)(7)(B) and section 303(a)(7)(B) (50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B)) of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 are each amended by striking “the purpose” and
inserting “a significant purpose”. UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY
PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT
TERRORISM (USA PATRIOT ACT) ACT OF 2001, PL 107–56, October 26, 2001, 115 Stat 291
Section 218; A FISA-related operation is justified where “a significant purpose” of such operation
“is to obtain foreign intelligence. This has cleared away much of the detritus that developed around
FISA that had historically impeded the use of FISA in criminal investigations and the use of FISA
information in criminal prosecutions.” JAMES G. MCADAMS, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
TRAINING CENTER, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA): AN OVERVIEW, 10.
66
Id. 115 Stat. 286.
67
NSA Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, Transparency Report: THE USA FREEDOM Act Business
Records FISA Implementation (15 January, 2016),
https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/about/civilliberties/reports/UFA_Civil_Liberties_and_Privacy_Report.pdf.
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the published example used by the NSA describing how the “hopping”
method works in practice:
To illustrate the process, assume an NSA intelligence analyst identifies or
learns that phone number (202) 555-1234 is being used by a suspected
international terrorist. This is the “specific selection term” or “selector”
that will be submitted to the FISC (or the Attorney General in an
emergency) for approval using the RAS [reasonable articulable suspicion]
standard. Also assume that, through NSA’s examination of metadata
produced by the provider(s) or in NSA’s possession as a result of the
Agency’s otherwise lawfully permitted signals intelligence activities,
NSA determines that the suspected terrorist has used a 202 area code
phone number to call (301) 555-4321. The phone number with the 301area code is a “first-hop” result. In turn, assume that further analysis or
production from the provider(s) reveals (301) 555-4321 was used to call
(410) 555-5678. The number with the 410-area code is a “second-hop”
result.68
The PATRIOT Act covers a wide variety of surveillance methods
across devices.69 The investigator's scope of authority grows exponentially
past the initial warrant, that only required there be a "significant purpose"
relating to the target, as they "hop" between all communication connected
to the target's phone. In practice, if a target realizes that they are being
investigated, they may decide to discard their cell phone. A roving wiretap
would allow the investigator to continue monitoring that person without
obtaining a new warrant from a judge.
Because of these broad allowances, the PATRIOT Act was under
intense scrutiny from civil and human rights watchdog groups for many
years, but Edward Snowden’s disclosures in 2013 finally brought the
extent of the Act’s abuses into the public eye.70
The original PATRIOT Act included sunset provisions that caused
many of its laws to terminate on December 31, 2005.71 Yet, Congress
renewed the legislation in March of 2006, and President Obama
subsequently extended many of the expiring provisions in May 2011,
including “roving wiretaps, searches of business records, and the
surveillance of ‘lone wolves.’” 72 “Lone wolf” surveillance authority
allows investigators to obtain surveillance orders without having to prove
that an individual was connected to a specific organization or terrorist
68

Id. at 6-7.
A few additional examples of surveillance methods allowed under the PATRIOT Act include: (1)
a pen register, which is an electronic device that records all outgoing communications from a
particular phone or computer; (2) trap and trace devices, which record all incoming communications
to a particular phone line or IP address; and (3) roving wiretaps, which allow investigators to follow
a particular target across communication devices. In practice, if a target realizes that they are being
investigated, they may decide to discard their cell phone. A roving wiretap would allow the
investigator to continue monitoring that person without obtaining a new warrant from a judge.
Electronic Surveillance, Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/electronic_surveillance
[https://perma.cc/Y5AM-UEWM]; UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY
PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT
TERRORISM (USA PATRIOT ACT) ACT OF 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 291 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
70
End Mass Surveillance Under the Patriot Act, supra note 62.
71
Electronic Surveillance, supra note 69.
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69

2021]

Tech & Authoritarianism

104

group. 73 Finally, when the extensions expired in 2015, Congress
repackaged many of its provisions in the equally aptly named USA
FREEDOM Act.
C. The USA FREEDOM Act
In response to increasing public outcry, the USA FREEDOM Act
modified many of the PATRIOT Act’s provisions to reduce its
exceedingly broad language. 74 Originally the FREEDOM Act was
intended to stand for Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping,
Dragnet-Collection and Online Monitoring Act.75 However, it was clear
that the final version would not live up to that title.
The FREEDOM Act only has a few major modifications to its
predecessor. First, the FREEDOM Act bans the bulk collection of
Americans’ telephone records and internet metadata.76 Second, it limits
the government’s data collection to the “greatest extent reasonably
practicable.”77 This standard differs in that the investigators can no longer
collect large amounts of data pertaining to a specific geographic region
alone, such as a city or an area code. 78 In practice, these adjustments
require agencies, like the NSA, to stop using an accumulated bulk
collection of phone data. Instead, the Agency may only request phone data
that is within two “hops” of the target whose search has been approved.79
This restriction greatly limits the data collection chain accessible to the
government and is key to maintaining privacy.
While these modifications curtail the broad data collection
authority given to United States authorities under the PATRIOT Act, there
are several other provisions worth noting: (1) the FREEDOM Act provides
the government with new reporting requirements to FISA authorities; (2)
it gives private companies more opportunities to report information about
the FISA orders they receive publicly; (3) it declassifies FISA court
opinions that require extensive legal interpretation, or, if not possible,
requires that a summary is provided; (4) it requires the FISC to designate
a panel of amicus curiae (civil oversight) to represent public interest; and
(5) it significantly extends multiple PATRIOT Act provisions, including
roving wiretaps and lone wolf surveillance authority.80
Thus, the FREEDOM Act contains significant improvements to
the “war–time” powers that the PATRIOT Act provided by banning bulk
data collection, increasing transparency, and providing additional
73

FISA Reauthorization, SENATE RPC (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policypapers/fisa-reauthorization[https://perma.cc/7Y8J-UMFR].
74
End Mass Surveillance Under the Patriot Act, supra note 62.
75
Fry, supra note 10
76
The USA Freedom Act, 1 Policies and Practices § 63:6.
77
Section (k) definitions, (4)(A)(i)(II) reads: “(II) is used to limit, to the greatest extent reasonably
practicable, the scope of tangible things sought consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible
things. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 107, 129 Stat. 274 (2015) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
78
Id at § 201, 129 Stat 277.
79
NSA CIVIL LIBERTIES & PRIVACY OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY REPORT: THE USA FREEDOM ACT
BUSINESS RECORDS FISA IMPLEMENTATION, at 6 (2016).
80
Under Title VI, specifically § 604, 115 Stat. at 286. § 402, 115 Stat. at 286. See also Yoo, supra
note 20 at 905.
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oversight to the FISA courts. 81 With the United States surveillance
legislation background summarized in this section, the subsequent section
will narrow the analysis of these issues by looking to U.S. surveillance
case law, specifically focusing on the following pivotal cases: U.S. v.
Carpenter and U.S. v. Moalin.
D. U.S. Surveillance Case Law
It is unlikely that the Constitution’s framers could have anticipated the
technological revolution that the world has undergone in the last twenty
years. The historical arguments advocating for privacy under the Fourth
Amendment were contingent on physical invasion. 82 Today, many
investigations can be done remotely since an individual’s most revealing
information now lies within the data trail of their phone or computer. Katz
v. United States was the first major deviation from the narrow Fourth
Amendment interpretations limiting protections only to “persons, houses,
papers and effects.”83 The Court created a two–part test: (1) did the person
have a subjective expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and (2)
was the person’s expectation of privacy objectively reasonable?84 Given
the broad interconnectivity most individuals have between online accounts,
phone companies, social media, etc., this 1960’s test creates difficult
questions when one asks, is there a subjective expectation of privacy
anymore, and when is it objectively reasonable to expect it?
In Katz, the Court held that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy while using a phone booth.85 Law enforcement had
installed a wiretap into the phone booth the defendant was using, which
was used to find illegal activity. 86 Similarly, in Kyllo v. United States, the
Court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
within his own home.87 In Kyllo, law enforcement used thermal imaging
to detect heat lamps used to grow marijuana.88 Because thermal imaging
devices were not available to the general public, it was reasonable to
assume that that tool would not be used without probable cause and a
warrant.89
Analogizing Katz, the internet could arguably be the modern
equivalent to a phone booth in the 1960s. Just as a person should have had
a reasonable expectation of privacy when making a call in a phone booth,
they should likewise have a reasonable expectation that the information
accessed and transmitted via the internet will not be accessible to the
government without a warrant. Analogizing Kyllo, the tools that
81

Id.
See e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that the wiretapping of defendant's phone
conversations did not constitute a violation of his constitutional rights), overruled in part by Berger
v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (The Court’s reasoning implies that the Fourth
Amendment’s protection are applicable to all areas where citizens have reasonable expectations of
privacy).
84
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85
Id. at 350-51 (majority opinion).
86
Id. at 348.
87
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001).
88
Id. at 29.
89
Id. at 34.
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government agencies such as the NSA have available to them are not
available to the public. Hence, metadata is arguably like thermal imaging,
and citizens should have the reasonable expectation that their internet and
phone data is private absent a warrant.90
The following cases: U.S. v. Carpenter and U.S. v. Moalin, raise
issues under current surveillance legislation. First, the Supreme Court
upheld law enforcement’s ability to track the defendant based on his cellsite location information in a 5-4 decision in Carpenter. Second, in Moalin,
the “hopping” method—as described above—was put to the test, and
national security justifications were held sufficient to uphold the
conviction. These cases set the stage for the current law in the U.S. and
will be used to analyze the government’s methods in relation to that of the
People’s Republic of China in later sections.
i.

U.S. v. Carpenter

In Carpenter v. United States, the Court faced questions regarding
Fourth Amendment violations based on the investigative methods used to
convict a defendant of multiple armed robberies. Law enforcement used
Cell-Site Location Information (CSLI) to determine if the defendant was
in the geographic areas in question at the times relevant to each robbery.
CSLI is generated “[e]ach time the phone connects to a cell site,”91 and
“[w]ireless carriers collect and store CSLI for their own business
purposes.”92
The Court made three critical points. First, cell phone companies
are considered third parties. Under the third-party doctrine, a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy, for Fourth Amendment purposes, in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. As a result, the
government is typically free to obtain such information from the recipient
without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.93 Second, despite cell
phone companies being considered third parties, an individual maintains a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the records of his physical movements
as captured through CSLI and cell phone carrier data. 94 Third, the
government must obtain a warrant based on a finding of probable cause
before acquiring CSLI from a wireless carrier. 95 The Court explained,
“although the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a government
search is ‘reasonableness,’ our cases establish that warrantless searches
are typically unreasonable where a search is undertaken by officials to
discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing.”96
Although narrow, Carpenter’s holding established a historic
precedent that protects a user’s third-party cell phone data from
warrantless searches. Specifically, the protection of a user’s CSLI and
other data that an individual could legitimately expect to be held private.
90

Fry, supra note 10.
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Id. at 2211-2212.
Id. at 2216.
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Id. at 2217.
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This standard could be reasonably be extended across multiple platforms
including the following: login-in locations on social media, Wi-Fi
connections, app data tracking movement and health, and browser location
data. Carpenter makes a specific acknowledgment to the “privacies of
life”97 that have historically been protected by the Fourth Amendment.
However, the discussion raised by Carpenter, and most Fourth
Amendment case law, applies to law enforcement’s request for a specific
individual’s data based on probable cause. As noted in the previous
sections, these issues are only compounded when government agencies
use technology to conduct surveillance on large populations.
ii.

U.S. v. Moalin

In U.S. v. Moalin, mass data surveillance methods were used in an
investigation to identify a national security threat, and consequently, the
Fourth Amendment violations of the parties’ collateral to the investigation
became largely justified.98 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s ruling to convict four U.S. residents accused of
conspiring to provide support to a foreign terrorist organization, alShabaab,99 and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments.100
Al-Shabaab uses distinctive methods of violence, such as
improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings. 101 Many people from
Somalia had fled the country in response to the conflict.102 Moalin and his
codefendants immigrated to southern California but remained actively
engaged in the developments in Somalia. 103 The four defendants were
attempting to send approximately $19,000 to their Somali contacts under
the pretense of “funding efforts relating to a school.”104
At trial, the government’s principal evidence consisted of multiple
recordings of phone conversations between Moalin, his codefendants, and
their Somali contacts.105 These recordings were obtained through a FISC
approved wiretap of Moalin’s phone. The relevant excerpts from the
recordings include Moalin speaking with a contact about “the young men
who are firing the bullets”106 and that “these men cut the throats of 60...”107
Ethiopians and destroyed five vehicles.108 Several of the calls involved a
suspected terrorist leader in al-Shabaab.109
The government obtained the telephone call records and acquired the
wire approval using bulk metadata collection methods under the “business
97

Id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
Moalin, 973 F.3d, at 985.
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Id. at 1010.
100
Id. at 985.
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Id. at 984.
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Id. at 985.
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Rachael Hanna, Metadata Collection Violated FISA, Ninth Circuit Rules, LAWFARE (Sept. 14,
2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/metadata-collection-violated-fisa-ninth-circuit-rules
[https://perma.cc/8QSX-YF3L].
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records” subsection of the FISA. 110 The bulk data collection was still
compliant with Federal law because the investigation took place before the
FREEDOM Act took effect. Thus, the government was allowed to use the
phone company’s database when NSA officials were determined to have
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the suspect’s phone number was
connected with “one of the identified international terrorist
organizations.”111 Further, the government was allowed to search phone
numbers within three “hops” of the suspected phone number.112
On appeal, the defendants contended that the meta data collection
methods used in this case violated their Fourth Amendment rights and the
FISA section used to authorize the search.113 At this point, the bulk data
collection methods used had been replaced by new provisions under the
FREEDOM Act, as described above. As a result, the defendants argued
that the phone data collected under the former program were “fruits of the
poisonous tree”114 and should therefore be suppressed. 115
The Court denied Moalin’s suppression motion and did not grant
security-cleared defense counsel access to the documents supporting the
FISA orders.116 Although the bulk data collection practice was declared
unconstitutional, the court found that this practice did “not taint the
evidence introduced by the government at trial,”117 and the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” argument did not apply here. The metadata “did not and
was not necessary to support the requisite probable cause showing.” 118
Accordingly, the court substantiated the evidence, while simultaneously
condemning the bulk metadata collection practice. 119 As a result, the
conviction was affirmed despite the government’s questionable methods
in acquiring the data.120
Moalin is significant for three reasons. First, the court held that
the NSA’s bulk meta data collection program violated the FISA.121 Not
only were the collection methods used to obtain Moalin’s phone records
possibly unconstitutional, but so was the collection of thousands of
Americans’ phone records that were affected in the process.122 Second,
Moalin is the first ruling to acknowledge and confirm Edward Snowden’s
2013 disclosures. Third, the court held that even if the bulk metadata
collection program violated citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights under the
“auspices of foreign intelligence investigation,” suppression of the
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Moalin, 973 F.3d, at 988.
Id.at 989.
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Id.
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This is a doctrine “extends the exclusionary rule to make evidence inadmissible in court if it was
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is tainted, so is its fruit.” Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
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evidence was not warranted. 123 Therefore, although the evidence was
“fruit of the poisonous tree,” the court held that the manner in which it was
obtained was not prejudicial enough to suppress the evidence under
current law.124
Although privacy rights of countless innocent people were
violated in the Moalin investigation processes, the method worked. This
outcome raises difficult questions concerning the delicate balancing act
between trusting law enforcement to track only those that pose a threat to
the U.S. and its interests, while preventing the collateral damage that can
result from the abuse of such power. Although this case was seen as a
success, and validated many of Edward Snowden’s claims, a consistent
narrative persists throughout U.S. policy: the privacy violations inflicted
upon innocent Americans are a necessary byproduct of the war on
terrorism.
Carpenter set an important precedent, but the use of digital
surveillance remains clouded in secrecy, and it is difficult to determine
whether legitimate national security purposes justify the use of
surveillance. 125 Perhaps, it is even more challenging when assessing
whether the methods used by intelligence agencies are proportional to the
actual threats the U.S. faces. Comparing international digital surveillance
policy with that of the U.S. may allow for a clearer understanding of what
laws are proportional when analyzing an appropriate balance between
national security and individual privacy rights. The next section will
analyze the PRC’s surveillance practices and how they have been put into
practice during the recent uprising in Hong Kong.
IV.

MAINLAND CHINESE LAW

Freedom of speech and the right to privacy have been important in
China since ancient times. 126 Despite stereotypical beliefs that a
collectivist society may not value privacy rights as an individualistic
society would, Article 40 of the PRC’s Constitution states that freedom of
privacy of correspondence of citizens of the People’s Republic of China
are protected by law.127 No organization or individual may, on any ground,
infringe upon citizens’ freedom and privacy.”128 However, Article 40 goes
on to say, “[e]xcept in cases where, to meet the needs of State security or
of criminal investigation, public security or procuratorial [sic.] organs are
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Id. at 984.
Id. at 997.
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See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that “the Government
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time-sensitive in nature”), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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Jingchun Cao, Protecting the Right to Privacy in China, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
645, 646-47 (2005) (asserting that privacy was protected, to some extent, in ancient China and an
awareness of privacy may be found all the way back to the Warring States Period).
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Country Profiles - China, OPENNET INITIATIVE. (Aug. 9, 2012),
https://opennet.net/research/profiles/china-including-hong-kong [https://perma.cc/868Q-HLKR].
128
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permitted to censor correspondence in accordance with the procedures
prescribed by law.”129
Further, Article 35 guarantees the same five basic rights as the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.130 Thus, the Chinese Constitution is
strikingly similar to the foundational principles of U.S. law. For instance,
both systems pledge to protect and value individual citizens’ freedom of
speech, assembly, and privacy from government intervention.
Nevertheless, the PRC has “one of the most pervasive and sophisticated
regimes of internet filtering and information control” in the world.131
While internet use in China has grown almost exponentially over the
last decade, the Chinese Government has integrated its surveillance
techniques along with it.132 The internet was believed to be a catalyst in its
early stages, allowing the Chinese people to break free from the
information vacuum under a post-Mao authoritarian government. 133
However, the Chinese government has utilized technology to control
individuals more intimately than ever before.134 “In an environment where
information flows pervasively, the most effective and efficient tool for
government control is probably neither strict law nor military force, but
technology itself.”135
Before proceeding into further analysis, it should be noted that PRC
case law concerning electronic privacy, surveillance, and censorship goes
unpublished which makes it inaccessible. 136 State secrets and personal
privacy law cases are said to be explicitly conducted in a closed court.137
First, this may be because the government does not wish for these cases to
be publicized because they may draw criticism, both domestically and
internationally. Second, the information in many of these cases may be
confidential state secrets, or the government does not want to expose the
extent of its surveillance programs. Lastly, the cases may not be handled
in open court but by compartmentalized government agencies.138 With this
baseline established, the proceeding section will analyze the current shift
in Hong Kong as mainland China continues to force a transition to bring
the region under PRC law.
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HONG KONG DISSENTION

First, it is necessary to establish the events leading up to the current
status of the formerly semiautonomous territory of Hong Kong. Second,
the national security laws imposed on Hong Kong in May 2020 will be
discussed in relation to citizens’ loss of freedoms, specific acts of privacy
infringement, and the justifications given by the Chinese government for
these actions. The last subsection will analyze how technology has been a
tool in the takeover of the formerly semiautonomous territory.
A. Historical Background
Until 1997, the small island of Hong Kong, which sits on China’s
southeastern edge, had been a territory of the United Kingdom for 155
years. Britain seized the territory during the First Opium War after the
Qing dynasty cracked down on the illegal opium trade conducted out of
the thriving port town. 139 In 1898, the two countries agreed to the
Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, which leased Hong
Kong.140
As the treaty’s expiration loomed in the early 1980s, the countries
agreed to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which established the “one
country, two systems” policy for 50 years.141 After the treaty officially
expired, Hong Kong was considered a Special Administrative Region of
China but maintained its own constitution under its Basic Law.142 Until
recently, these policies held firm.143 Hong Kong has maintained a court
system closely resembling that of the United Kingdom. It even retained
British judges.144
However, since 2014 this independence has slowly chipped as
elections have been conducted using a list of candidates vetted by
Beijing. 145 In the last year, Hong Kong’s government, autonomy, and
independent court systems have been fundamentally uprooted and
replaced by mainland Chinese law.146 The policies approved under promainland officials have become the breaking point for many Hong Kong

Erin Blakemore, How Hong Kong’s complex history explains its current crisis with China,
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residents who have grown accustomed to the semi-autonomous territory’s
uniquely independent position.147
The initial spark began in February 2019 when the Hong Kong
legislature approved the Fugitive Offender and Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matter Legislation (Amendment) Bill.148 The specific concern
over the legislation is the possibility for extradition to mainland China.149
Opponents to this bill believed that citizens could be unjustly persecuted
based on political motivations and result in unfair trials on mainland
China.150 Essentially, Hong Kong citizens feared that they could be subject
to the harsh anti-government crimes that limit the free speech of
mainlanders.
For example, Lam Wing-kee, Causeway Bay Books manger in Hong
Kong, maintained a stock of books that are analogous to tabloid
material.151 From twisted love affairs involving CCP leader Xi Jinping, to
questionable tales about the innerworkings of the Party, many of these
paperbacks could be written off as wildly fictional.152 However harmless
these stories may seem, Mr. Lam was kidnapped and taken to mainland
China, where he suffered eight months of “mental torture” in a prison
cell.153 This account is one of many that caused outrage throughout Hong
Kong and fueled an increasingly urgent fight to maintain autonomy.
On July 6, 2019, after almost eight months of increasingly violent
protests, a shut-down of the economic center, and countless arrests, the
Hong Kong legislature backed down and withdrew the bill in its
entirety.154 However, this was seen as an insufficient remedy for many
people who had been personally affected by police brutality and lengthy
prison sentences related to the protests.155 As a result, riots continued, and
the pro-democracy movement raged on.
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B. National Security Law
The CCP, however, was not ready to back down. On June 30, 2020, in
response to the outbreak of dissent generated by the Hong Kong protests,
President Xi Jinping signed a broad new National Security Law (NSL) that
would fundamentally change Hong Kong’s freedoms and its relationship
with the mainland. The following is a revealing excerpt from the English
version of the law:
Safeguarding national security; preventing, suppressing
and imposing punishment for the offences of secession,
subversion, organization and perpetration of terrorist
activities, and collusion with a foreign country or with
external elements to endanger national security in relation
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
protecting the lawful rights and interests of the residents
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.156
In May 2020, National People’s Congress (Chinese legislature) Vice
Chairman Chen cited “growing risks to China’s national security in the
city since the outbreak of anti-extradition bill protests in June 2019.”157
Chen asserted that protestors were “anti-China” and wanted to “bring
chaos to Hong Kong.”158 He then stated that protestors “openly insulted
and defaced the national flag” and “incited Hong Kong people to be antiChina and anti-communist party.”159
The NSL allows Chinese law enforcement to arrest and try
individuals in the Hong Kong region for any crimes involving antigovernment sentiment.160 In addition, the PRC has appointed officials to
serve in two new pro-communist entities established by the law and
created the Office for Safeguarding National Security, a new department
related to enforcement on the ground.161 Regarding the “one country, two
systems” agreement, PRC appointed officer 162 Zhang stated that the NSL
“intends to move closer to the side of ‘one country.”163
Article 62 of the NSL states that the law “shall prevail where
provisions of the local laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
region are inconsistent with this law,” thus establishing supremacy over
the Hong Kong Basic Law that upheld many rights similar to the United
States’ First Amendment.164 As a result, on July 1, 2020, the first day the
NSL was implemented, ten people were arrested for violations under the
156
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law.165 The violations included Hong Kong citizens showcasing banners,
T-shirts, and books; with slogans like, “One Nation, One Hong Kong,”166
and “Restore Hong Kong. Revolution of Our Times.” 167 The people
arrested ranged from age fifteen to sixty-seven.168
This crack down on anti-mainland dissent only touches the surface
of the issue. Blatant banners advocating for an independent Hong Kong
make it easy for law enforcement to spot and arrest their creators. However,
hiding in plain sight are thousands of CCTV cameras equipped with the
latest facial recognition technology.169 Regardless of public opinion on the
NSL, the provisions clearly state what kinds of action will lead to
punishment, and PRC surveillance is difficult to evade.170
It should be noted that the laws do not expressly, or even implicitly,
restrict the government’s internet surveillance powers, and surely will not
when national security interests are involved. 171 The next section will
discuss the role technology has played in PRC surveillance, both in Hong
Kong and on the mainland, and predictions regarding its future
ramifications.
C. PRC Digital Surveillance
The Chinese government has created perhaps the world’s largest
internet filtering system, and the information that people have access to on
the Chinese internet is limited. 172 Many western search engines, social
media companies, and websites, are banned completely.173 The blocked
websites and services are those that are perceived threats to the Chinese
Communist Party: including information regarding the Tiananmen
uprising in Hong Kong; the anniversary of Tibetan protests; and human
rights violations of the Uyghur Muslim minority. 174 One of the more
humorous examples involves blocking the name and image of the cartoon
bear Winnie the Pooh, after CCP leader Xi Jinping’s likeness was equated
165
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to the character. 175 China’s censors tend not to tolerate ridicule of the
country’s leader. 176 The CCP argues that these internet censorship
practices are desirable as they help to maintain social order, productivity,
and stability.177
China’s surveillance regime foundation is based on the “Golden
Shield Project,” which is a digital surveillance network that covers all
means of security across the country. 178 Since 2006, this system has
connected Chinese surveillance networks, including local police station
surveillance, security cameras, data management centers, and internet
cafés.179 Notably, this system is particularly effective when combined with
the government’s implementation of real-name registration rules, which
require internet users to disclose their identities when accessing the
internet, thus holding them accountable and encouraging “responsible”
internet use.180
Further, the introduction of facial recognition technology has become
unignorable in recent years. Using CCTV cameras and artificial
intelligence (AI), government databases can filter through millions of
citizens’ registration pictures to identify individuals.181 Of course, the use
of this technology is justified for safety and law enforcement purposes.
When a person is wanted for a crime, authorities may locate them any time
they appear in a public place. A notable example of this was when a man
wanted for financial crimes was recognized by this system while he was
standing in a crowd of fifty thousand people at a Chinese pop concert.182
CCTV cameras captured his face, AI distinguished it from the millions of
people registered, and he was quickly apprehended.183
In Shenzen, a giant billboard displays the registration photo of people
that CCTV catches jaywalking, as well as a list of names of people who
haven’t paid their debts.184 One Chinese company boasted that its facial
recognition technology is 97.7% 185 Another creative example with known
use is the robotic dove.186 The bird-like drones fly just as a real bird would
and reportedly to go undetected, even in other animals’ presence.187 With
175
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this vast array of technology encroaching on every facet of citizens’ lives,
it is hard to imagine any “privacies of life” that are truly safe.188
D. Effect on Hong Kong
The border between the mainland city of Shenzen and the island of
Hong Kong is not separated by a physical wall, but a digital one.189 While
the mainland is controlled by internet filters, surveillance, and facial
recognition, Hong Kong’s internet is still open and unabated.190 Although
the PRC’s electronic dragnet has closed in on Hong Kong, protestors have
been quick to fight against the comprehensive system. Fearful of the
encroaching surveillance presence, CCTV cameras are painted, covered,
and smashed to prevent the AI surveillance from taking over the city.191
As described above, numerous anti-government behaviors have been
declared illegal.192 The laws are broadly written, and many protestors will
be tracked down and prosecuted if the “Golden Shield” systems take
control of Hong Kong. 193 For example, a person will be deemed guilty
under Article 29 of the NSL if they commit any of the following offenses:
(1) threatening to use force to undermine, and territorial integrity of the
PRC; (2) disrupting the formulation and implementation of laws or
policies… by the Central People’s Government; (3) engaging in hostile
activities against the… PRC government; (4) provoking by unlawful
means the hatred among Hong Kong residents towards the Central
People’s Government.194
The combination of strict National Security Laws and comprehensive,
unavoidable surveillance technology would fundamentally change the
freedoms that the people of Hong Kong have enjoyed. Strict regulation of
speech, protest, and freedom of information would be implemented, and
those who had been involved in anti-mainland activities would have “big
brother” watching them at every turn.
In addition, when Hong Kong citizens retreated from the protests to
voice their opposition at voting polls, Beijing responded with oppressive,
controlling policies. 195 A senior Communist Party official recently
announced that China’s national legislature planned to “rewrite election
rules in Hong Kong to ensure that the territory was run by patriots, which
Beijing defines as people loyal to the national government and Communist
Party.”196 Pro-democracy candidates had hoped to win a majority in the
Hong Kong legislature in the September 2020 elections in order to block
budgets; force communist-backed leader, Carrie Lam, to resign; and fight
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to preserve the city’s relative autonomy.197 Communist officials claim that
these actions equated to “interfering with government functions,” which is
an offense under the NSL.
These additional moves seek to solidify mainland China’s power in
Hong Kong and crush any hopes of the free and open elections that
residents have sought after since Britain returned the territory to Chinese
rule in 1997. Thus, the watchful eyes of the CCP are close to asserting
their unabated surveillance control over Hong Kong in the near future.
VI.

POLICY COMPARISONS AND IMPLICATIONS

There are significant differences between PRC and U.S.
implementation, enforcement, oversight of surveillance, and data
collection. While the U.S. has sought to implement safeguards and
oversight, with the Fourth Amendment extending to digital surveillance,
many government agencies are still operating behind closed doors, and the
extent of their power is largely unknown.
Although the PRC policies described above may create allusions to an
Orwellian dystopia, Chinese policy only varies slightly from those of the
U.S. While the U.S. creates exceptions to privacy in their hunt for terrorists,
the PRC does the same under less ambiguous labels. Both governments
have unfettered access to a wide array of private data when national
security is involved. Thus, the question becomes: which system is more
appealing to private citizens, and why? Is it more valuable for a citizen to
know that a government is actively watching them? Or is it more attractive
for citizens to put their faith in the law that relies on the fact that the
government is not watching, even if they are?198
A. U.S. Capitol Protests
To many Americans, the invasion of the U.S. Capitol building on
January 6, 2021, was a shocking attack on the foundations of American
democracy. However, a substantial population of Americans may have
considered the attack on the U.S Capitol to be a heroic, last-ditch effort to
uphold a strong nationalist American under Donald Trump.199 This subtle
shift in perspective can change one’s understanding of the government’s
use of surveillance technology after the Capitol riots from a necessary use
of technology to a dangerous slippery slope.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks in NYC, it seemed clear that
America needed to act quickly. Thus, the USA PATRIOT Act was born.200
After Trump supporters stormed the Capitol, there was as similar reaction.
People needed to be held accountable, and cell phone data collection was
197
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the best method. However, it has been argued that “[t]he data collected on
Jan. 6 is a demonstration of the looming threat to our liberties posted by a
surveillance economy that monetizes the movements of the righteous and
wicked alike.”201
Almost forty percent of the phone data linked to Trump’s rally stage
on the National Mall was found in and around the Capitol building during
the siege. 202 Many rioter’s cell phones connected to the cellular and
wireless data infrastructure under the Capitol building upon arrival. 203
These individual cell towers quickly turned each person’s phone into a
tracking device as investigators identified each cellphone that connected
to the localized network. 204 In addition, DOJ officials stated that
investigators used facial recognition to identify rioters from the video and
photo evidence from Capitol building cameras and social media
postings.205
However, soon after these events, a source came to The New York
Times with similar cell phone tracking data.206 Although this was a private
citizen, the data they provided “showed what some in the tech industry
might call a God-view vantage of that dark day.”207 Not only were the
protestors tracked from Trump’s rally to the Capitol building, but the
source was able to track individual’s movements to and from their home
states.208
On the one hand, law enforcement’s cell phone data collection
brought many rioters to justice. Without it, many people who stormed the
Capitol building could have returned to their home states and never faced
repercussions. Again, it can be argued that there are legitimate uses of
broad data collection methods, with this being a prime example. On the
other hand, “to think that the information will be used against individuals
only if they’ve broken the law is naïve; such data is collected and remains
vulnerable to use and abuse whether people gather in support of an
insurrection, or they justly protect police violence.”209
A shift in perspective, candidate, or political ideology, can quickly
change one’s view of the U.S. Capitol attack from an assault on democracy,
to a heroic effort led by impassioned freedom fighters. The same goes for
Hong Kong. To some, the anti-mainland rebels were simply
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troublemakers. 210 To others, it was the territory’s last chance at
maintaining a semi-autonomous, democratic haven. The blurring of these
moral lines between a righteous protest and a misguided one – only
convolutes the discussion of justified government data access.
B. National Security Justifications
In both countries, the invasion of individual privacy rights has been
justified under a consistent group of key words: “national security,”
“terrorism,” “undermining sovereignty,” and “collusion with foreign
power” are a few examples. The question becomes: at what point is a
passionate anti-government rioter a terrorist, and how much trust should
citizens put into law enforcement agencies?
National security intelligence is about staying a step ahead of potential
threats. During the Napoleonic Wars, the French created innovative landbased communication systems using towers that sent line-of-sight signals
from tower to tower along the coast, decreasing communication time
between bases and frontlines.211 This information allowed the French to
re-route forces, send supplies, and warn allies faster than any of their
counterparts. 212 Recent wars in the Middle East have utilized predator
drone imaging to produce multi-hour surveillance footage, revealing
enemy encampments, supply lines, and geographic features. 213 This
actionable information, which allows a government to be one step ahead
of a threat, has always been a part of national security.214 However, our
modern age has changed the form of this actionable information and has
made it more challenging than ever to uncover what is necessary for
security.
Denis Clift, former Chief of Staff for the U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency, describes this modern perspective:
The need for information superiority is, in many instances,
is causing U.S. intelligence to take dramatically new
approaches. The Internet era has become the Intelligence
Communities new strength as well as its new challenge.
Cold War assumptions driving intelligence collection and
analysis- those enemy targets were closed societies and
that superpower rivalry trumped all other issues- are
assumptions of the past.215
Potential threats are no longer limited to major superpowers and can no
longer be handled through traditional, direct methods.216 True terroristic
210
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threats are hard to detect ahead of time and this requires intelligence
services to comb through an incredible amount of digital information. An
example may be the bulk data collection deemed unconstitutional in
Moalin.217 Although individuals connected to Moalin were affected by the
broad data collection, the suspect was caught, and law enforcement
prevented U.S. residents from funding a Somali terrorist organization.218
After over a full year of protests, civil unrest, and economic
disruption, some Hong Kong citizens are grateful for the National Security
Laws. 219 One letter to the editor stated, “the national security law has
helped make Hong Kong peaceful again. Complaints about suppression of
freedom are not based on the full facts. Also, has your reader seen how
those ‘[w]estern countries react to their own protestors?” 220 While some
citizens may be relieved that life may be returning to some degree of
normalcy, the system they are returning to is far different from its
predecessor. The policies imposed by the PRC may provide safety and
security for now, but the suppression of speech, censorship of information,
and ever-watchful facial recognition technology will undoubtedly persist.
VII.

SOLUTIONS

The USA FREEDOM Act was a major piece of bipartisan legislation.
It closed the loophole allowing the NSA to engage in “warrantless searches
for the phone calls or emails of law-abiding Americans” by bringing more
transparency to the FISC and created an advocate for members of the
public to represent them before the FISC.221 As described above, the Act
creates additional oversight within FISC, which promotes transparency for
non-classified materials, and bans bulk metadata collection. 222
Additionally, case law has acknowledged privacy abuses in Moalin and
Carpenter, and courts have emphasized the importance of Fourth
Amendment Rights in our digital age.223
However, the U.S. has yet to enact comprehensive privacy law. While
the European Union’s omnibus General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) stands as a model for the rest of the world, U.S. industry-specific
privacy laws only provide piecemeal protection.224 “[B]ig tech companies
have an immense economic interest in making sure any online privacy
regulations are weak and do not limit their business models… because
knowledge, to them, can also equal power.”225 Because Congress is still
217
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largely polarized, it seems that an omnibus federal data privacy law is still
far from certain. Although, many progressive states have moved forward
with their own comprehensive privacy laws, including California,
Colorado, and Virginia.226
The new technologies being demonstrated in the PRC and Hong Kong
are not limited to their continent. There is little doubt that similar practices
will begin to be used in the U.S., and if privacy laws are not implemented
beforehand, residents may be subject to Fourth Amendment violations
before the public ever becomes aware.
Concerns over the use of facial recognition technology (FRT) can only
be addressed by appropriate oversight, assessment, and careful
implementation. While comprehensive federal law would be ideal, the
Center for Strategic International Studies has stated that “each level of
government that authorizes the use of FRT will need some oversight
mechanism… FRT use will need to be accompanied by some assessment
of the effects on privacy, both before deployment and on a regular basis
after employment.”227
Portland, Oregon became the first jurisdiction in the country to ban the
commercial use of facial recognition technology in public places within
the city, including stores, restaurants, and hotels. Beginning January 1,
2021, “private entities” will be prohibited from using “face recognition
technologies” in “places of public accommodation” within Portland,
except: “(1) to the extent necessary to comply with federal, state, or local
laws; (2) for user verification purposes to access the user’s own personal
or employer-issued communication and electronic devices; or (3) in
automatic face detection services in social media applications.”228
Lastly, checks and balances can erode quickly. The Trump era was a
stark example of how the executive branch can fire agency officials and
quickly replace them based on loyalty rather than accountability. 229
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power can result in abuse. Only the implementation of legislation narrowly
tailored to privacy rights, backed by a high level of accountability and
judicial oversight, will protect average citizens from the abuses of power
our digital era has created. Few courts should operate in secret.
Independent government agencies must review those handling the most
sensitive national security concerns. The consequences of broad and
unchecked surveillance power abuses are too great, and each inquiry
which breaches an innocent American’s rights must be justified under a
high level of scrutiny.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Globalization and technology have changed the way our society
functions at all levels. With new national security threats, greater
surveillance capabilities, and more information centered around the digital
sphere than ever, maintaining a balance between transparency and security
has become increasingly challenging.
The events in Hong Kong have provided a revealing example of the
swift action a government can use to control a territory when seemingly
justified. The PRC’s combination of surveillance methods touches on
many aspects of life: public, online, and private. Only Hong Kong’s people
can decide where their value systems lie and what rights are worth taking
risks for. If push comes to shove, international condemnation may be a
critical factor in determining Hong Kong’s fate.
In the U.S., the law must continue to adapt to new technologies to
preserve the privacies of life that people have fought to protect for so many
years.230 "Protection against such invasion of the sanctities of man’s home
and privacies of life was provided in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment by
specific language. But time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes.”231 Nevertheless, the current privacy law is far
behind the conditions and purposes of the twenty-first century. Thus, each
individual’s right to privacy should be considered sacred moving forward,
because once the flood gates have opened and everyone’s digital profile is
accessible, monitored, and tracked, there is no going back.
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